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International Courts and Global Democratic Values: 
Participation, Accountability, and Justification 
 
Jonathan Kuyper and Theresa Squatrito 
Forthcoming in Review of International Studies 
 
It is widely noted that world politics suffers from a democratic deficit.1 In a post-Cold War era 
characterized by globalization and deep interdependence, this deficit arises from two sources. 
First, the actions of national governments increasingly have an effect beyond their own territorial 
borders creating transnational spillovers.2 Second, key agents of global governance – 
international organizations (IOs) and their bureaucracies, non-state actors and private agents – 
exercise pervasive forms of authority. In both instances, individuals and collectives are 
oftentimes divorced from the decision-making processes that determine their lives.3 If the notion 
of collective self-governance – in which affected parties exercise popular sovereignty – is to 
make sense in a global age, democracy must go beyond the nation state.4 Over the past two 
decades in particular, the cause and consequence of the global democratic deficit have been 
recognized, conceptualized, and problematized by international relations (IR) scholars, political 
theorists, lawyers, and activists.  
 This article contributes to work on global democracy by looking at the role of 
international courts (ICs). Although courts are typically understood as essential to national 
democratization, their presence in transnational governance has not been adequately appreciated 
by global democrats. This is somewhat ironic because early work on global democracy, 
especially that by David Held and Daniele Archibugi, suggested that ICs specifically – and the 
                                                           
1 Richard Higgott and Eva Erman, ‘Deliberative Global Governance and the Question of Legitimacy: What Can We 
Learn from the WTO’, Review of International Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp. 449-70. See also Klaus Dingwerth, ‘Global 
Democracy and the Democratic Minimum: Why a Procedural Account Alone is Insufficient’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 20:4 (2014), pp. 1124-47. 
2 David Held, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?’ Review of International Studies, 29:4 (2003), pp. 465-80. 
3 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Reinventing Global Democracy’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:1 (2014), pp. 
3-28. 
4 Raffaele Marchetti, ‘A matter of drawing boundaries: Global democracy and international exclusion’, Review of 
International Studies, 34:2 (2008), pp. 207-224.  
2 
 
legalization of world politics more generally – would be essential for global democracy.5 Yet 
today, there exists twenty-three permanent, operational international judicial bodies that have 
issued tens of thousands of binding rulings.6 Against this background, we examine the 
relationship(s) between ICs and the ongoing process of global democratization.  
 The core question of this article is if, how, and in which ways ICs bolster or undermine 
democratic values beyond the state. We contend that ICs are indeed able to advance global 
democratic values and shape democratic practices. They can do so by fostering equal 
participation, accountability, and public justification that link individuals directly with sites of 
authority beyond their own nation-state. We maintain that the ability of ICs to promote these 
values is conditioned by institutional design choices concerning access rules, review powers, and 
provisions regarding judicial reason-giving. We canvass these design features of different ICs 
and assess the promises and pitfalls for global democratization. Doing so enables us to discuss 
how design choices condition the practice and behavior of ICs. Although the internal democratic 
legitimacy of ICs is important, this article is concerned with how ICs promote the 
democratization of world politics at large.7  
 Methodologically, we draw upon an original dataset covering the 24 ICs in existence 
during the post-World War II period. This dataset contains data on ICs’ formal rules governing 
access for private, non-state actors, review powers, and judicial reason-giving. The numerical 
increase in ICs enables us to talk about global democratization over time while our data on 
design features in all 24 courts across different world regions speaks to democratization across 
space. The article is thus particularly novel in bridging normative theory with substantive and 
systematic empirical data.8 
The article proceeds in four sections. First we discuss the literature on global democracy 
emphasizing the recent turn toward striving for democratic values under pluralist conditions. 
                                                           
5 Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
6 Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014), p. 75.  
7 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts: A Conceptual Framework’, 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 14:2 (2013), p. 370. 
8 Other scholars have made significant strides in connecting some strands of normative (moral) theorising with 
international relations literature. See, for instance, Toni Erskine, ‘Locating Responsibility: The problem of Moral 
Agency in International Relations’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 699-707. This article is the first to look 
specifically at the nexus of ICs and normative values of global democratization.  
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Drawing on the current state of the literature, we outline three values that together allow us to 
examine the advancement or recession of global democratization. Second we underline the 
prevalence and importance of ICs and suggest that ICs may have a pivotal role to play in global 
democratization. Third we look at how equal participation, accountability, and justification are 
secured by different ICs and note which institutional design features are critical for each value. 
We discuss both the promise and pitfalls of realizing these values by looking at how these values 
are realized or inhibited in practice. The conclusion discusses future directions of research by 
linking global democratization with debates about the legitimation of global governance at large.  
 
Global Democratization 
 
Work in the field of international normative political theory has flourished in recent years.9 
Roughly speaking, three separate strands can be discerned. First, global justice scholars have 
examined the appropriate allocation of burdens and benefits to be distributed across national 
borders and scrutinized how various institutional (pre)conditions trigger different moral duties.10 
Second, theorists and philosophers working in the just war tradition have examined the historical 
and ethical rules governing inter-state warfare and conflict.11 Finally, global democrats have 
probed how the legitimacy of world politics relates to the notion of collective self-governance 
which stands at the heart of democratic governance within national polities.12 
 This article is concerned with global democratization. The notion of a democratic deficit 
– in which decisions taken beyond the state pierce national sovereignty and expose individuals to 
rules they have not helped formulate – is now extensively recognized.13 The global democratic 
deficit, tethered as it is to globalization, increased national interdependence, and the prominence 
                                                           
9 For a recent and comprehensive overview, see Anthony F. Lang, International Political Theory: An Introduction 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
10 Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘Justice and Priority of Politics to Morality’, Journal of Political Philosophy 15:2 (2008), 
pp. 137-164. See also Laura Valentini and Tiziana Torresi, ‘Introduction – International law and global justice: a 
happy marriage’, Review of International Studies, 37:5 (2011), pp. 2035-2041. 
11 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (4th edn, New 
York: Basic Books, 2006). See also Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity and non-combatant immunity’, Review of International 
Studies, 40:1 (2014), pp. 53-76. 
12 Adrian Little and Kate Macdonald, ‘Pathways to Global Democracy: Escaping the Statist Imaginary’, Review of 
International Studies, 39:4 (2013), pp. 789-813. 
13 Held, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?; Dingwerth, ‘Global Democracy and the Democratic Minimum’. 
See also Johan Karlsson Schaffer, ‘The boundaries of transnational democracy: alternatives to the all-affected 
principle’, Review of International Studies, 38:2 (2012), pp. 321-42. 
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of international law, has forced attention toward the normative legitimacy and sources of 
authority that underpin transnational social, economic, and political decision-making. While it is 
possible to assess the sociological legitimacy of global authority,14 it is also clear that 
authoritative relationships can be legitimated through democratic practice in which the 
‘governed’ or ‘affected’ parties participate in the formation of those authoritative rules which 
bind them.15 
In order to dampen the global democratic deficit, numerous proposals, models, 
blueprints, and schemes have been touted to give individuals more direct say in how their lives 
are governed. Although a full exposition is neither possible nor necessary here, early work was 
often formulated in terms of idealized ‘models’ or ‘terminal blueprints’ that could be strived 
toward.16 For instance, the model of cosmopolitan democracy came with a variety of short- and 
long-term institutional prescriptions including international courts, transnational parliaments, and 
multi-level governance architecture which would enable individuals to participate in global 
decision-making.17 World government scholars went beyond the cosmopolitan model and 
outlined a hierarchical and encompassing system of state-like institutions that could be replicated 
at the global level. This would include a world parliament, global constitution, and federal 
government with coercive power.18 In a different vein, global civil society advocates have often 
promoted a deliberative model that puts democratizing faith in non-state actors who can employ 
different discourses to oppose, contest, and shape more formal international politics.19 
Intergovernmental models, radical proposals, pragmatist suggestions, and postmodern models are 
                                                           
14 Lisa Dellmuth and Jonas Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, 
institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation in the United Nations’, Review of International Studies, 41:3 
(2015), pp. 451-475. 
15 Marchetti, ‘A matter of drawing boundaries’. 
16 For an overview, see Daniel Bray and Steven Slaughter, Global Democratic Theory: Problems and Possibilities 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 
17 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
18 Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against — Ethical Theory, Institutional Design, and Social 
Struggles (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). William E. Scheuerman, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the world state’, Review of 
International Studies, 40:3 (2014), pp. 419-441. 
19 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). See also James Bohman, ‘Democratising the Global Order: From Communicative Freedom to  
Communicative Power’, Review of International Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp. 431-47; Peter Newell, ‘Democratising 
biotechnology? Deliberation, participation and social regulation in a neo-liberal world’, Review of International 
Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp. 471-491. 
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just several of the other prescriptions for giving individuals a greater say in the transnational 
forces which afflict their lives.20  
 However, the literature on global democracy has shifted away from this strategy of 
proposing idealized models to be realized as closely as possible.21 Instead, scholars and 
practitioners are now searching for how different democratic values and practices emerge under 
existing conditions and devising ways to advance their attainment. This method, broadly 
speaking, mirrors a turn in global justice debates toward non-ideal and (so-called) realist 
theory.22 Instead of stipulating a fully-democratic institutional scheme that serves as a target or 
benchmark, we should work from within current arrangements to make productive steps forward 
seeking to understand which values and principles should regulate different institutional 
arrangements for global democratization.23  
This article joins this general reorientation of the literature. The question then becomes: 
which democratic values should be sought in world politics generally, and through ICs 
specifically? We seek to establish if, how, and under which conditions ICs enable practices of 
equal participation, accountability, and public justification beyond the state. We have two 
methodological rationales for selecting these values. First, these values reflect three prominent 
strands of democratic thinking: participatory, liberal, and deliberative. Participatory democrats 
stress the importance of individual involvement in forming rules and laws. Liberal democrats 
highlight the centrality of holding decision-makers to account and the role of a balance-of-power 
                                                           
20 See respectively: Robert Keohane, Steven Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing 
multilateralism’, International Organization, 63:1 (2009), pp. 1-31; Theresa Squatrito, ‘Conditions of Democracy-
enhancing Multilateralism: Expansion of Rights Protections in Europe?’, Review of International Studies, 38:4 
(2012), pp. 707-733; Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000); Daniel 
Bray, ‘Pragmatic Ethics and the Will to Believe in Cosmopolitanism’, International Theory, 5:3 (2011), pp. 446-
476; Shaffer, ‘The boundaries of transnational democracy’.  
21 Little and Macdonald, ‘Pathways to Global Democracy’; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Is global democracy 
possible?’ European Journal of International Relations, 17:3 (2010), pp. 519–542. 
22 See Laura Valentini, ‘Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map’, Philosophy Compass, 7:9 (2012), pp.654-
664. There are also interesting connections with ‘practice-dependent’ thought in justice debates. Practice-dependent 
arguments maintain that the “scope, content, and justifications of justice depends on the structure and form of 
practices that the conception is intended to cover”. See Sangiovanni, ‘Justice and Priority of Politics to Morality’, p. 
138. Transposing this argument to global democracy would entail that the appropriate normative values and 
institutional designs necessary depend on the shape, form, and authority of global governance itself. While we find 
connections with practice-dependence and non-ideal theory in global justice intriguing, exploring those connections 
lies outside the scope of this article. 
23 We use the term ‘global democracy’ to refer to proposals or blueprints, and ‘global democratization’ to signify the 
ongoing attainment of democratic values.  
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in that relationship. Finally deliberative scholars iterate the formation of preferences through 
public reasoning that stands at the core of democratization efforts.  
Second, these values represent a synthesis of recent work on global democratization from 
IR, political theory, and international law. Magdelena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin 
put forward participation and accountability as the core values civil society actors can promote 
in global democratic governance.24 These authors also advocate the importance of deliberative 
conceptions of global democratization. Similarly, Klaus Dingwerth, in a recent article, stresses 
“the benefits of disaggregating the concept of (global) democratic governance” into 
inclusiveness, transparency, accountability, and deliberation.25 In political theory, Kate 
Macdonald and Terry Macdonald highlight public disempowerment, accountability, and 
transparency as the relevant criteria for global democratization.26 Public disempowerment 
requires giving affected parties the ability to signal (dis)approval and sanction authoritative rule-
makers, and transparency provides public justification for how authority is wielded.27 Within 
international law – especially the field of global administrative law – Nico Krisch advocates the 
importance of accountability and contestation (participation and deliberation) for democratizing 
the postnational order.28  
 
Values of Democratization 
 
From this brief inter-disciplinary review of global democratic scholarship, convergence can be 
noted. There is rough agreement on both the ways to pursue global democratization – as a set of 
values derived from democratic theory – and on what those values might be. We identify equal 
participation, accountability, and public justification as central. While there are certainly other 
candidates, less consensus exists on these values. For instance, some might question why we 
                                                           
24 Magdelena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin, ‘Democracy in global governance: The promise and 
pitfalls of transnational actors’, Global Governance, 16:1 (2010), pp. 85-6. 
25 Dingwerth, ‘Global Democracy and the Democratic Minimum’, p. 1141. We are aware that Dingwerth also 
highlights the importance of moving beyond purely procedural assessments of global democratization. As we 
discuss, there are substantive limitations to the attainment of each value that we draw out. As such, we concur with 
Dingwerth’s general position but continue to emphasize the importance of striving for normative values. 
26 Terry Macdonald and Kate Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening 
Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’, European Journal of International Law, 17:1 (2006), pp. 
89-119. 
27 Ibid., p. 104. 
28 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 78-88. 
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have not included human rights in our list of relevant democratic values. While we think that 
protecting human rights is an important function for ICs to consider, the values of accountability 
and public justification go a long way toward safeguarding individual rights. Moreover, there are 
significant debates in political theory about whether human rights are a necessary condition for 
democracy – a debate without consensus.29 As such, we have not made ‘human rights’ a separate 
democratic value, but nor do we preclude its importance or potential as a value for future 
research. 
The goal of this article thus remains to determine if ICs can embody these values, through 
which modes and mechanisms this can occur, and whether this provides a springboard for global 
democratization. From our analysis, it becomes clear that ICs can be designed to engender these 
values to greater or lesser degrees, variation which is conditioned by institutional design features. 
There are also substantive limitations (beyond issues of institutional design) that inhibit the 
realization of different values in practice, such as unequal distribution of resources, geographical 
remoteness, and epistemic hindrances.30 As such, we are interested in both the internal design 
features of ICs that enable or hamper these democratic values, as well as the effect on the wider 
system of world politics. Indeed, it is the ways in which ICs enable affected individuals to be 
connected democratically with other sites of authoritative rule-making beyond the state that is 
key to their democratizing potential. Before moving on to this analysis, we flesh out each value 
in more substantive terms.  
Equal participation means that citizens affected by the authoritative exercise of public 
power should have the opportunity and ability to be involved in how that authority is wielded. 
This entails equal capacity to set the agenda as well as shape the rules, laws, and regulations that 
will affect their lives. We recognize that equality of participation may often rest upon forms of 
representation as individuals cannot always be directly involved in all decision-making 
processes. National representatives or other self-appointed representatives (interest groups, non-
governmental organizations, etc.) can all help connect individuals with sites of public power.31 
Precisely how equal participation is secured will and should vary depending upon the 
institutional scheme in need of democratic regulation. 
                                                           
29 On this debate, see Seyla Benhabib, ‘Claiming rights across borders: International human rights and democratic 
sovereignty’, American Political Science Review 103:4 (2009), pp. 691-704. 
30 These, as well as other limitations, are fleshed out in the third section examining the institutional design features 
related to each value. 
31 Macdonald and Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability’. 
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Accountability, in a democratic sense, means that those affected by decision-making 
should have the right to hold power wielders “to a set of standards, to judge whether they have 
fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met”.32 This criterion gives affected 
individuals the opportunity to hold decision-makers at different levels of governance accountable 
for their actions and stop the arbitrary exercise of power which can undercut individual 
autonomy. Operative accountability mechanisms provide an ex ante incentive for decision-
makers to take consideration of how affected parties will react to decisions being made in their 
name. 
Finally, public justification provides those affected by decisions with a rationale for how 
rules are being formulated and applied in various contexts.33 This value derives largely from 
work in the field of deliberative democracy that stresses the importance of providing reciprocal 
and generalizable arguments for how public power is exercised and how it is connected to the 
public use of reasoning.34 Reciprocity means that justification is mutually-acceptable to parties in 
a deliberation, whereas generalizability connotes a set of reasons that could be shared by affected 
parties due to shared institutional or moral structures. Public justification thus rests upon the 
offering of reasoned argument and, in turn, the acceptance of those reasons by affected 
individuals.   
These values provide the basis for our analysis of how democratic practice may be 
instantiated and deepened beyond the nation-state. The criteria do not presuppose any specific 
institutional structure, indeed quite the opposite: it recognizes that the specific way different 
values are constructed depends on the type of institutional scheme being regulated and the 
diverse means available to individuals seeking democratic control over authority.35 It is worth 
noting that the methodological move toward ‘values of democratization’ has been criticized on 
                                                           
32 Ruth W. Grant and Robert Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, American Political 
Science Review, 99:1 (2005), p. 29. See also Jonathan W. Kuyper, ‘Global Democratization and International 
Regime Complexity’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:3 (2014), pp. 620-46. 
33 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011). See also Peter Newell, ‘Democratising biotechnology? Deliberation, participation and 
social regulation in a neo-liberal world’, Review of International Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp. 471-491. 
34 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Dryzek, Deliberative  
Democracy. 
35 Little and Macdonald, ‘Pathways to Global Democracy’.  
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the grounds that democracy cannot be conceptually disaggregated so simply.36 While we 
recognize this issue, we maintain that looking at these values helps make clear the trade-offs and 
conflicts between values as well as the way values can be mutually-supportive. In our analysis, 
therefore, we identify the institutional design features of ICs that are crucial to these democratic 
values as well as potential pitfalls for global democratization.  
It is also worth discussing briefly three additional caveats. First, it is important to be clear 
about the composition of the relevant demos which is owed democratic standing of equal 
participation, accountability, and public justification. We have suggested that those individuals 
affected by the exercise of authority across and beyond the state are entitled to democratic rights. 
This fits well with the recent work on global democratization as it tracks current scholarship on 
how multiple demoi of affected agents can emerge beyond the state.37 ICs, on this view, may 
provide one pathway for the coalescence of demoi, and we bring out these formations in our 
analysis. Understanding how ICs can contribute to the formation of relevant demoi by connecting 
individuals to sites of public power requires sustained empirical analysis focusing on design and 
institutional relationships between ICs and other actors in world politics. 
Second, it might also be contended that ICs are important for the legalization of world 
politics, but are not the appropriate institutional structures through which democratization should 
be promoted. It is a key point of this article that the global democratizing potential of ICs should 
be judged by looking at their role in the wider system. ICs can themselves be sites of authority 
that citizens are able or unable to participate in, but they can also curtail the authority of other 
national and international bodies. Given that global democratization is embryonic, it remains 
important to have an open conception concerning what role ICs may play.38 By focusing on ICs 
both as sites of authority and institutions embedded in a wider system, we are able to understand 
how ICs operate within a broader division of labour that either promotes or impedes global 
democratization.  
                                                           
36 Eva Erman, ‘In Search of Democratic Agency in Deliberative Governance’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 19:4 (2012), pp. 847-68. 
37 Macdonald and Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability’. However, c.f. Shaffer, ‘The boundaries of 
transnational democracy’; Bohman, ‘Democratising the Global Order’; Laura Valentini, ‘No Global Demos, No 
Global Democracy? A Systematization and Critique’, Perspectives on Politics, 12:4 (2014), pp. 789-807. 
38 Or, to use Robert Goodin’s phrase, global democracy is ‘in the beginning’. See Robert Goodin, ‘Global 
Democracy: In the Beginning’, International Theory, 2:2 (2010), pp. 175-209. 
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Finally, there are obvious connections between the increasing prominence of ICs and 
debates over the constitutionalization (or lack thereof) of international law.39 While some 
scholars see emergent legal constitutionalism taking place in world politics, others see increasing 
fragmentation and pluralism of legal orders and values.40 Although we are certainly witnessing 
an upsurge in the number and authority of ICs and other IOs, the literature is divided on the 
democratic potential of each pathway. Some authors suggest that global democracy is predicated 
on a strong rule of law safeguarded by constitutionalism, while others suggest that democratic 
values can emerge (or even thrive) under pluralism.41 Although this article does not directly 
engage these debates, we are interested in whether or not different design features of ICs can 
promote or impede democratic values beyond the state. Looking at our three different values, 
mapping the design of ICs, and unpacking the effects in practice we provides instructive 
evidence for both constitutionalists and pluralists as they seek to determine which pathway is 
unfolding and the related normative (i.e. democratic) potential. 
 
The Role of International Courts 
 
Today ICs are a prominent and influential element of governance across and beyond the state. 
International courts are here defined as permanent international judicial bodies that meet the 
following criteria: (1) decide the question(s) brought before them on the basis of international 
law, (2) follow pre-determined rules of procedure, (3) issue legally binding outcomes, (4) are 
composed of independent members, and (5) require at least one party to a dispute is a state or an 
                                                           
39 See, for instance, Antje Wiener, Anthony F Lang, James Tully, Miguel Poiares Maduro, Mattias Kumm, ‘Global 
constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, Global Constitutionalism, 1:1 (2012), pp. 1-15. 
See also Karolina Milewicz, André Bächtiger and Arne Nothdurft, ‘Constitutional pluralism or  
constitutional unity? An empirical study of international commitment (1945–2007)’, Review of International 
Studies, 36:2 (2010), pp. 305-36. 
40 For overviews, see: Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International: Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gunther Teubner and 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25:4 (2004), pp. 999–1045. See also Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global 
Legal Pluralism’, Southern California Law Review, 80:6 (2007), pp. 1155-237. 
41 On the former, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form in International Law’, in Neil Walker and Martin Loughlin (eds.), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University, 2007), 269–90.  On the 
latter, see Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism. 
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international organization.42 In recent years, the number of international courts has grown 
significantly. Figure 1 illustrates the expansion of ICs over time. Only one IC, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), existed in 1950.43 By 1990, there were a total of six ICs.44 The number of 
ICs peaked in 2006, when there were twenty-four. After the disbanding of the Tribunal of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal in 2010, there were twenty-three 
international courts at the end of 2014. In addition to the numerical increase, ICs merit attention 
when examining world politics because they often play active and important roles in different 
issue areas, including the environment, trade, human rights, and armed conflict. 
 
                                                           
42 Cesare Romano, Karin Alter and Yuval Shany, ‘Mapping International Courts and Tribunals, the Issues and 
Players’, in Cesare Romano, Karin Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 6. Permanence is not defined by whether the court itself is 
permanent, but whether the judges sit permanently and are not selected ad hoc by the parties to a dispute. Cesare 
Romano, ‘A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions’, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2:1 
(2011): p. 262. 
43 Prior to 1950, two international courts existed: the Permanent Court of International Justice (later replaced by the 
ICJ), and the Central American Court of Justice (operational 1908-1918). Non-permanent international judicial 
proceedings prior to 1950 included the Nuremburg Trials (1945-1946), the Tokyo Trials (1946-1948), the ad hoc 
dispute settlement system of GATT established in 1947, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration established in 1899. 
44 These six courts were the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the Benelux Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Justice (now the Court of Justice of the European Union), the International Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
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Figure 1. Number of ICs over time, 1945-2014  
 
Given that global democratization involves giving affected individuals and collectives a 
say in the rules that govern their lives, there are several specific reasons for looking at ICs. First 
and foremost, ICs are central to dispute settlement in international relations. While ICs were 
traditionally designed only to settle disputes between state parties, today their role often extends 
to include disputes between private parties and states (e.g., human rights courts tend to have 
jurisdiction over disputes between private actors and a state). Even when disputes do not include 
non-state parties, the outcomes of the judicial proceedings can have profound effect on 
individuals and collectives.45 In this vein, ICs have been called upon to adjudicate an 
unprecedented number of disputes. Alter concludes that through 2011, there have been a total of 
37,236 binding rulings issued by ICs in contentious cases.46  
                                                           
45 Nienke Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’, Temple Law Review, 86:1 (2013), pp. 61-
106. 
46 Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, p. 75. 
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Second, beyond settling disputes, ICs fulfill several other roles that affect international 
and national authority. Laurence Helfer identifies several, including “exercising constitutional, 
enforcement, and administrative review; stabilizing normative expectations and legitimating the 
exercise of public authority; improving state compliance with primary legal norms; engaging in 
judicial lawmaking to clarify or expand substantive obligations; and enhancing the legitimacy of 
international norms and institutions, including of ICs themselves.”47 As such, ICs may promote 
the goals of an IO or regime. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been 
central to the institutionalization of regional integration in Europe.48 Similarly, the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism has facilitated trade relations globally and is often viewed as one 
of the most successful elements of the WTO.49 Research on international criminal tribunals also 
suggests they can deter violence and contribute to the building of domestic democratic 
processes.50  
Third, in conjunction with interlocutors, ICs can improve state compliance with 
international commitments and thus help to address global problems. We can see that the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) have contributed to reforms in law and policy governing the rights of individuals.51 
For example, Helfer and Voeten have shown the transformative effects of the ECtHR on LGBT 
rights across Europe.52 These issues bear directly on the rules governing individuals. 
Fourth, ICs contribute to world politics by clarifying and developing international legal 
obligations. Through the process of legal interpretation and adjudication, ICs can transform 
international law through sometimes incremental, minor forms of legal clarification and at other 
times through more active lawmaking. For example, the ICJ and the International Criminal 
                                                           
47 Laurence Helfer, ‘The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators’, in Romano, Alter and Shany, (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook, p. 464. 
48 Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, 
International Organization, 47:1 (1993), pp. 41-76. 
49 Chad Bown, ‘On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement’, Review of Economic Statistics 86:3 
(2004), pp. 811-823. 
50 Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons, ‘Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?’ (2014) Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552820v; Lara Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The 
Hague Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013).  
51 Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
52 Laurence Helfer and Erik Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights 
in Europe’, International Organization, 68:1 (2014), pp. 77-110.  
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have asserted that laws of war apply to internal 
conflicts.53 Likewise, the CJEU extended the scope of EU law to include human rights.  
Finally, ICs – especially those with compulsory jurisdiction and access for private 
litigants – have strengthened an international rule of law and contributed to the judicialization of 
world politics.54 These are only a few of the ways we can observe the effects of international 
courts on transnational authority. Against this backdrop, we consider if ICs can promote global 
democratization by focusing on how ICs are designed to integrate the principles of equal 
participation, accountability and public justification in world politics.  
 
International Courts, Institutional Design, and Global Democratization 
 
Equal Participation 
 
ICs can bolster global democratization by engendering possibilities for individuals to participate 
in how transnational authority is exercised. To assess how ICs foster or impede equality of 
participation, we analyze the institutional design features that condition access to the courts. As 
Cichowski argues, an “important factor in understanding how courts can change participatory 
politics is the degree of access the public has to legal institutions”.55 Formal rules governing 
access for stakeholders, in other words, are the institutional condition to participation. Recent 
research has noted that access correlates strongly with participation and has been an essential 
activity of international courts.56 Moreover ICs with non-state actors’ access tend to have the 
majority of their cases filed at the request of non-state actors, and many of these ICs also have 
larger caseloads than their counterparts with less access.57 We draw from our original dataset on 
formal rules of ICs to examine how international courts enable opportunities for participation. 
We look at the data on formal rules that regulate private, non-state actors’ access to international 
                                                           
53 Eve La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
54 Yuval Shany, ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International 
Judiciary’, European Journal of International Law, 20:1 (2009), pp. 73-91. See also Alter, The New Terrain of 
International Law. 
55 Rachel A. Cichowski, ‘Courts, Rights and Democratic Participation’, Comparative Political Studies, 39:1 (2006), 
p. 55. For a longer discussion, see Rachel A. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, 
Mobilization and Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
56 See Alter, The New Terrain of International Law; Cichowski, ‘Courts, Rights and Democratic Participation’.  
57 Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: 
Interstate and Transnational’, International Organization, 54: 3 (2000), pp. 457–488. 
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judicial proceedings.  All ICs that have been in operation between 1945 and 2015 are included 
(N=24).58 The coding of access rules is based on the treaties and protocols establishing 
international courts, the rules of procedures of ICs, as well as some case law that established new 
access measures (which applies only in a few instances). Informal access options are excluded 
from the dataset because they are not dimensions of institutional design. Nevertheless, informal 
access may provide important modes of participation (discussed below). 
There are four general types of formal rules that regulate access to international courts.59 
These rules govern who can participate in judicial proceedings and in what capacity. The first 
type of rule addresses whether private, non-state actors can act as a direct litigant. Rules that 
allow stakeholders to become direct litigants are those that grant them opportunity to directly file 
a petition to a court to have a complaint heard by the court. Several courts are designed to grant 
stakeholders privileges to participate as a direct litigant, including the ECtHR, the Andean 
Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ), among others.  
Second, there are rules governing indirect litigants which specify whether private, non-
state actors can become a litigating party through referral of their case to an IC by a public 
authority. These rules differ from direct litigant access, where a stakeholder can directly petition 
an IC, because the stakeholder has access indirectly through a referral mechanism. Such rules 
include instances where a stakeholder can become an indirect litigant through a referral by a 
national court. Rules granting access as an indirect litigant through a national court referral are 
common to many regional trade courts, and are best exemplified by the CJEU’s preliminary 
ruling procedure. Similarly, indirect litigant access can be defined by rules that require an 
intergovernmental commission, in combination with the acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by 
the relevant member state, to refer a case to the court. This form of indirect litigant access is 
common to international human rights courts. For example, six states have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) to review an 
individual petition. A similar procedure exists for the IACtHR, as well as for the ECtHR prior to 
1998. 
                                                           
58 Our sample of ICs corresponds with Alter’s; see Alter, The New Terrain of International Law. Appendix 1 
provides a complete list of the ICs. 
59 Previous data on access to ICs do not cover all four types. When speaking of international criminal tribunals one 
might also victim access, such as offering testimony. We do not include this in the coding because it does not have a 
direct equivalent in the non-criminal tribunals.  
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The third type of rule to govern access, and thus act as an institutional condition to 
participation, are those that regulate whether private, non-state actors can act as a third party in a 
case before an IC. Third parties can either be interveners or amicus curiae. While the privileges 
of an intervener are different from amicus, these are similar in that they offer a non-litigant the 
opportunity to voice their position on a case to the court. Many ICs provide third party privileges 
to stakeholders, including the IACtHR, the CJEU, and the ECtHR.   
A fourth type of rule governing access to ICs regulates whether stakeholders can observe 
court hearings. This type of rule is specified by provisions that determine if an IC’s oral hearings 
are to be held in public, thus allowing stakeholders to observe the proceedings of that IC.60 Many 
ICs allow for the public to observe hearings as a general rule. Yet, where the general rule is for 
public hearings, there are most often exceptions for closed proceedings. For example, the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice states that “[T]he hearing in Court shall be public, unless the 
Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted” 
(Article 46).  Conversely, some ICs, such as the WTO panels and Appellate Body, operate with 
the general rule that proceedings are closed, and thus restrict private, non-state actors’ access to 
judicial proceedings.61   
 
                                                           
60 The connections between public justification and public participation rights are expanded upon below. Observer 
status, though, is a good example of how different democratic values intersect in supportive ways.  
61 Proceedings of the WTO AB can be open to the public upon agreement of the disputing parties. Otherwise, 
proceedings are closed to the public. Ruth Mackenzie, Cesare Romano, Philippe Sands, and Yuval Shany, The 
Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 88-89. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of international courts with stakeholders access (by type, 2015) 
(N=24)   
 
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of international courts that feature each of the four 
types of access as of 2015.62 As the figure shows, most ICs (87.5 %) operate with the general 
rule that hearings are held in public, and thus allow private non-state actors to participate as 
observers. In fact, only three ICs do not have a general rule that oral proceedings of the court are 
to be held in public – the WTO panels and Appellate Body (AB), the Benelux Court of Justice 
(BCJ) and the Mercosur Permanent Review Tribunal (PRT). On the other hand, direct litigant 
privileges are the least common form of access to ICs. Today, more than half (58.3%) of 
international courts are designed with access for stakeholders to participate as direct litigants. 
                                                           
62 In accord with most comparative research on international courts, the SADC Tribunal is included in this figure 
based on its status in 2010, even though its operation has since been suspended. See Appendix for information on 
how each IC is coded on each of the four types of access. Supplementary appendix lists all sources and specific 
provisions coded. 
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Direct litigant access is usually featured by regional trade courts. The ECtHR also features this 
form of access. Our data also reveal that all 24 ICs feature at least one type of access, six ICs 
feature three types, and nine feature all types of access (not shown). 
These various access provisions provide affected parties with opportunities for 
participation. First, direct and indirect litigant access can enable stakeholders to participate in 
shaping public agendas in world politics. The ability to shape public agenda can be viewed as a 
form of democratic participation.63 Direct and indirect litigants shape the agenda of ICs because 
petitioning a court contributes to what issues are on its docket. Individuals’ and societal groups’ 
petitions to ICs, either directly or indirectly, have transformed the agendas of ICs in several 
instances. For example, direct and indirect litigants have put human rights issues on the dockets 
of regional trade courts. This has occurred for the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).64 Recent 
petitions brought before the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) have brought human rights issues 
to the original jurisdiction of the court.65 Similarly, referrals to the CJEU led to women’s rights 
entering into the policy domain of the European Union and the CJEU.66  
In other words, the participation of individuals and groups in international judicial 
proceedings, especially as litigants, contributes to an IC’s agenda in ways that states could not, or 
would not. Private litigants have incentives to bring claims against non-compliant states, whereas 
states can have disincentives to do so. This opens up the possibly to mitigate the democratic 
deficit exacerbated by cross-national spillovers. Concerns for retaliation can prevent states from 
filing claims against fellow member states. Citizens, however, have incentives to do so, 
especially when they have seen only blockage through other channels of mobilization.67 Indeed, 
it is questionable whether many issues would have come to international courts if it were not for 
the opportunities presented by access.  
While participation as direct and indirect litigants contributes to shaping an IC’s agenda, 
the democratizing effects on world politics are much broader. This occurs in several ways. First, 
litigation before ICs can serve as a catalyst for mobilization and participation in other domestic 
                                                           
63 Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 6. 
64 James T. Gathii, ‘Mission creep or a search for relevance: the East African Court of Justice's human rights 
strategy’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 24: 2 (2013), pp. 249-296.  
65 Maurice Tomilson v Trinidad and Tobago & Belize. [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ); Shanique Myrie v. Barbados. [2013] CCJ 
3 (OJ).  
66 Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society. 
67 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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settings. Second, it can also lead to changes in international rules. For example, the CJEU’s early 
rulings on women’s rights contributed to mobilization of civil society organizations and 
secondary legislation by the European Union governing gender equality rights and 
environmental protection.68 Similarly, we have seen how the early referrals to the IACtHR on 
enforced disappearances preceded and contributed to later international efforts to establish 
binding law on the prohibition of enforced disappearances. Thus, direct and indirect litigant 
privileges enable citizens to participate in defining what lies on the agenda of international 
courts, and thus on broader public agendas in world politics.  
 Direct and indirect litigant access, as well as third party privileges, also allow for 
democratic participation by presenting stakeholders with the opportunity to present a voice in 
decision-making. These three forms of access give affected persons opportunities to present both 
factual information and legal arguments as well as introduce valuable perspectives that can 
contribute to decision-making by ICs. Stakeholders are often well-equipped to contribute to the 
information that judges have to make their decisions for two reasons. On one hand, non-state 
stakeholders have valuable resources that judges or state parties do not. In particular, these 
resources include scientific expertise, local knowledge and sector-specific information. On the 
other, stakeholders contribute to the representation of a diverse set of societal perspectives that 
are otherwise missing from judicial proceedings. As Bogdandy argues, courts are not 
representative institutions because of the requirements of independence and impartiality.69 
Nevertheless, judges should consider societal convictions and interests when adjudicating. Third 
party access, especially, can serve as a vehicle for these convictions and interests to enter into the 
judicial process. Williams and Woolaver find that “[A]micus can be very useful in ensuring that 
the perspective of these groups [victims and groups within society] is heard” during international 
criminal tribunals’ proceedings.70 Thus, third party access may compensate for an IC’s inability 
to be a representative institution and help to integrate societal perspectives into judicial decision-
making.  
Access to observe the hearings of international courts can also bolster participation. 
While seemingly minor, open proceedings enable international judicial proceedings to become 
                                                           
68 Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society. 
69 Bogdandy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts’, p. 370. 
70 Sarah Williams and Hannah Woolaver, ‘The Role of Amicus curiae before International Criminal Tribunals’, 
International Criminal Law Review, 6:2 (2006), pp. 185. 
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salient to the broader public. Public observers are likely to include media, bringing an 
international decision-making process into the public sphere. Similarly, third party access can 
improve democratic participation by also building a public sphere around international court 
proceedings.71  
While IC access rules can foster participation beyond the state, participation may in 
practice be impeded by various issues which inhibit the realization of global democratization in 
practice. Access to ICs, especially as a litigant, requires that some personal interest in a dispute 
be demonstrated and that the dispute meet specific admissibility or standing requirements. This is 
distinct from other forms of democratic participation, which generally only hinge on citizenship, 
rather than interest.72 While access rules treat individuals equally based on citizenship, it is then 
restricted to those individuals who can demonstrate an interest while fulfilling admissibility 
criteria. This clearly restricts the scope of litigants to those capable of articulating how their 
interests are affected. While this is problematic in some ways, it also speaks to the potentiality of 
ICs in helping delineate demoi beyond state boundaries. 
Equal participation through ICs is also impeded in practice by factors such as monetary 
and epistemic resources, or even physical proximity to an IC which structurally disadvantage 
some individuals and groups more than others. At the domestic level, litigation is costly and 
demands knowledge of the law as well as expertise in how to navigate the legal system. 
International litigation is also demanding of resources, in addition to being extremely remote 
from the average person. These factors – funding, knowledge, and geography – can all 
substantively undermine the potential of democratic participation by affected parties. Some 
additional design features, such as a traveling court (for example, a feature of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice) or legal aid, can however compensate for such structural disadvantages and be 
used to improve the opportunities and equality of participation featured by ICs. Similarly, some 
may argue that those societal actors who participate through courts lack democratic credentials. 
While this may be the case, judges usually have the discretion to determine whether such actors’ 
views should be disregarded. 
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Despite possible shortcomings, access to ICs provide an important means of participation 
in world politics. There is also previous scholarship suggesting that private non-state actors are 
in practice accessing ICs to challenge the exercise of transnational authority.73 It remains clear, 
however, that the design of access rules affect the terms of participation. Direct and indirect 
litigation enable deeper participation which can extend to agenda-setting. Alternately, third-party 
and observer status is a more limited form of participation, perhaps enhancing representation. 
When these various access designs are featured in conjunction, participation is heightened even 
further.  As such, the design rules of ICs on access effects the equality of participation offered to 
individuals. Thus ICs can improve equal participation in a shift toward global democratization, 
but the mechanisms of access condition the depth and equality.74 Moreover, while design rules 
condition the attainment of democratic participation through ICs, additional epistemic, 
geographic, and resource-based factors enable and constrain the practice of global 
democratization.  
 
Accountability 
  
ICs can also bolster the practice of accountability in global governance by safeguarding and 
ensuring that transnational authority is exercised according to established standards vis-à-vis 
affected agents. Grant and Keohane suggest that courts, including international courts, are a type 
of accountability mechanism.75 We agree with this assessment and identify more specifically 
how they can be used to hold states and international actors and institutions to account, thus 
facilitating global democratization.  
ICs have two types of powers that enable them to serve as an accountability mechanism 
in world politics and grant democratic control to affected parties. First, some ICs have been 
designed with the power of administrative review. These ICs “have jurisdiction to assess the 
validity of administrative decisions and a corresponding authority to annul illegal administrate 
                                                           
73 Several ICs have seen a temporal increase in their dockets as a result of direct and indirect access. For example, 
see Cichwoski, ‘Courts, Rights and Democratic Participation’; Alter, The New Terrain of International Law.  
74 While we argue that access to ICs fosters participation beyond the state, and thus global democratization, some 
scholars have argued that these same features can improve the internal legitimacy of ICs as well. Armin von 
Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking’, German Law 
Journal, 12:5 (2011), pp. 1341-1370. See also Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’. 
75 Grant and Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power’. 
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actions”.76 International administrative review is one way in which state and IO authority can be 
checked and protected against arbitrary decisions. Specifically, ICs with administrative review 
assess whether administrative decisions abide by procedural rules and correctly apply the law. In 
practice, international administrative review by an IC is exercised when a court declares an 
administrative decision to be illegal and, in some instances, requires compensation for the 
wronged. We are interested in both review of international and national administrative decisions 
as both cross-national spillovers and the authority of IOs can contribute to the global democratic 
deficit. However, the degree to which ICs have the power of administrative review varies. While 
some ICs have authority to annul both international and national administrative decisions, others 
have only one form of administrative review and some have no delegated administrative review.  
Second, some international courts have been designed to have the power of constitutional 
review, or the jurisdiction to assess the validity of legislative acts.77 As many IOs are able to 
produce legislative output (e.g., resolutions, directives, and regulations), constitutional review 
can play an important role in safeguarding that international legislative output does not conflict 
with higher order legal principles such as an IO’s constitutive treaty, general principles of law, or 
human rights norms. ICs can also have the power to review and annul national law. The extent to 
which ICs have these constitutional review powers differs; some are designed with these powers 
while others are not. Those with the authority of constitutional review have been known to 
exercise this authority, albeit infrequently.78 Constitutional review by ICs allows stakeholders to 
challenge international and national legislation and when an IC finds in their favor the act is 
nullified. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
76 Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, p. 202. 
77 Ibid., p. 286. A prominent example of a case where an IC exercises international constitutional review is the Kadi 
case decided by the CJEU. Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
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78 Ibid., p. 295. 
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 Source: Coding is based on Alter, The New Terrain of International Law.  
 
Figure 3. International Courts with Administrative and Constitutional Review (N=24) 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of ICs designed with administrative and constitutional 
review powers, and thus the potential to operate as an accountability mechanism where domestic 
and international decisions are evaluated.79 As Figure 3 shows several ICs (46%) have the 
authority to review international administrative actions, and roughly 38% can review 
international legislative acts. Fewer ICs have the power to declare void the actions or acts of 
states. One-third of ICs can review the actions of national authorities, while 21% can review 
national legislative output. Regional courts embedded within regional economic and trade 
organizations are especially central to understanding how accountability is practiced through 
international courts. On the face of it, issues such as human rights are often outside of the 
accountability mechanisms provided by ICs because administrative and constitutional review 
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tends to be provided by regional trade courts. However, several regional trade courts have either 
been granted or expanded their jurisdiction to include human rights issues, including the EACJ, 
SADC Tribunal, CJEU, and others. 
Where ICs do not have the authority of constitutional and administrative review, their 
ability to hold other sites of transnational authority accountable are formally limited. 
Nonetheless, despite not having explicit powers to nullify national administrative decisions, 
several courts exercise a form of administrative review in practice when declaring national 
authority has contravened international legal obligations. For example, the WTO DSM and 
international human rights courts hold states to account for laws, policies, and actions which may 
violate international trade law and international human rights law.80 ICs that can declare national 
administrative actions contravene international obligations, according to either substantive or 
procedural standards, act as a check on national authority.81 Also, while international criminal 
tribunals do not directly hold transnational authority to account (as they are mandated to hold 
individuals accountable), they indirectly ensure some kind of accountability for national 
authority (both as it is exercised within state borders and across), through the prosecution of 
heads of state and other actors who act as agents of the state. 
When ICs can review the actions of domestic or international administrators or the 
validity of international legislative output, they have the potential to advance global 
democratization through practices of accountability. Many courts do have these powers, 
indicating that ICs can hold other IOs or states to account based on predetermined standards. 
When these powers are held in combination with access for private non-state actors, ICs are able 
to serve as an accountability mechanism that is available to individuals and societal groups. In 
fact, the powers of administrative and constitutional review most often coincide with access 
provisions. All ICs with administrative review have compulsory jurisdiction and access for direct 
and indirect litigants, meaning that individual stakeholders can use litigation before these 
international courts to challenge administrative decisions.82 Similarly, constitutional review is 
also common to ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and access for direct and indirect litigants. In 
most instances, constitutional review can be initiated by individual stakeholders.  
                                                           
80 Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, pp. 210-211. 
81 Michael Ioannidis, ‘A Procedural Approach to the Legitimacy of International Adjudication: Developing 
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As with equality of participation, though, the ability to hold international actors to 
account and curb arbitrary power through ICs does suffer from some pitfalls. First, as previously 
mentioned, non-state actors’ use of ICs may be limited by factors such as monetary and 
epistemic resources. These limitations provide a substantive critique of global democratization 
by suggesting, as Dingwerth does, that issues of education and subsistence are required to make 
use of democratic procedures. While we agree with this, improvements in health, education, 
resource distribution, and so on can also be promoted by formal rules of accountability.83 In 
other words, there is likely a mutually beneficial relationship between giving individuals formal 
rights of participation and accountability in ICs and the substantive improvement in life 
prospects for affected individuals that deserve consideration by designers.  
Second, even when ICs are designed to have the power of administrative and 
constitutional review, they face many political constraints that limit the extent to which they 
utilize this power in practice. This can include the ability of other IOs to exercise informal forms 
of power over the judicial process of different ICs and intransigence on behalf of states to follow 
IC decisions. This is not a problem inherent to ICs, but rather an issue that afflicts the decision-
making of all IOs. However, problems surrounding how informal power politics might contribute 
to the global democratic deficit certainly warrant more attention. This speaks to the role of ICs as 
part of a broader division of labour for global democratization. If IOs and states exercise 
informal power over the decision-making procedures or outputs of ICs, then their role as 
accountability wielder – through both administrative and constitutional review – is severely 
dampened. At the least we suggest that informal power between states, along with limitations to 
individuals, will be factors that determine how well the design rule of administrative and 
constitutional review play out in practice.  
Third, not all international organizations fall within the purview of international courts, as 
defined here. This means that many sources of authority in global governance do not have 
corresponding accountability mechanisms similar to that of ICs. On the other hand, several 
international organizations have quasi-judicial processes or bodies that can in some ways hold 
international authority to account. For example, in the area of development, the World Bank has 
the Inspection Panel and the Asian Development Bank the Compliance Review Mechanism. 
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Despite these pitfalls, accountability in world politics is, we argue, greater with 
international courts than without, and thus ICs are critical for global democratization. 
Administrative and constitutional review powers are the core design features that enable 
international courts to offer a series of checks-and-balances on the use of arbitrary power by IOs 
and other state actors. Moreover, when these review powers can be initiated by individual 
stakeholders, as opposed to only states, the ability of an IC to serve as a democratic 
accountability mechanism is heightened by giving affected parties avenues to shape decision-
making (and the interpretation of existing rules) beyond the state. This again indicates that 
institutional design is critical in bolstering accountability, strengthening the links between 
individual participation and accountability, and ensuring robust democratic practice beyond the 
state.  
 
Public Justification 
 
International courts may also contribute to global democratization through practices of public 
justification. As Habermas has consistently suggested, it is the public use and justification of 
reasoning which sits at the core of democracy.84 A characteristic of judicial decision-making is 
that judges explain the reasoning of their decisions and deliver their decisions publically. Even 
when judicial decisions are not elaborate in their reasoning, they nonetheless specify the legal 
basis for their decisions. ICs are no exception. In fact, ICs are often (though interestingly not 
always) required by a matter of their constitutive treaties or rules of procedure to make decisions 
public and identify the reasons of their decisions. As a consequence of these two requirements, 
ICs are uniquely positioned to bring public justification to the decisions that govern international 
politics.  
To assess the extent to which ICs are designed to provide public justification, we draw 
again on our original dataset looking at ICs’ formal rules on the publicity and reasoning of court 
judgments. Specifically, the dataset codes formal rules on: (1) whether decisions are to be 
delivered in a publically open session of the court, (2) if decisions are formally required to be 
published, at least in part, (3) whether decisions are to be reasoned, and (4) if separate 
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(concurring or dissenting) opinions can be issued by judges.85 Figure 4 shows what percentage of 
ICs feature each of these various rules. 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of ICs with formal rules on publicity and reasoning of decisions 
(N=24) 
 
As Figure 4 highlights, most ICs are formally required to make their decisions public in 
some manner. Seventy-nine percent of ICs are required to issue their decisions in a public 
session, while seventy-five percent must publish their decisions. In many instances, where one of 
the requirements of publicity is missing, it is compensated by a requirement to make their 
decisions public according to the other means. For example, the most recent version of the 
ECtHR’s rules of procedure does not require that decisions be delivered in open court, yet 
decisions are required to be published. In fact, the only IC that does not have formal rules to 
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issue decisions in public or to publish them is the WTO Appellate Body (AB). Yet, the WTO 
AB’s reports are all publically available. Many courts also make their decisions public in 
practice through publication on their websites, despite the formal rules. This suggests that some 
informal practices can develop along democratic lines even if formal measures are not codified. 
 Having decisions made public is only one aspect of how ICs practice public justification. 
ICs, in conjunction with publically-issued decisions, give reasoned decisions. As Figure 3 shows, 
roughly 96% of ICs are required by formal rules to provide reasoning to their judgments. The 
one instance where this is not the case is the WTO AB (though the ad hoc panels are required to 
do so). Even without the formal requirement, however, the AB in practice does provide reasoned 
judgments. Reason-giving by ICs however varies in terms of quality as well as their mode and 
logic. In addition, ICs vary in whether separate opinions can be issued; figure 4 illustrates that 
half of ICs are allowed to issue separate (or dissenting) opinions.  
We argue that the combination of making decisions public and explicating the reasoning 
of a decision advances the value of public justification in democratic ways. First, giving reasons 
for a decision is a device for informing the public of what the decision-maker is doing and why, 
while also controlling the use of discretion. When giving reasons decision-makers are “likely to 
make more reasonable decisions than he or she otherwise might and is more subject to public 
general surveillance”.86 This is similar to the notion that open deliberation generates a ‘civilizing 
force’ to avoid being hypocritical or exercising arbitrary power.    
Second, the virtues of reciprocity and generalizability stand at the core of justified reason 
giving, especially in the deliberative democratic tradition.87 Providing reasons which take 
consideration of dissenting opinions is clearly an institutional embodiment of both reciprocity 
and generalizability by framing decisions and arguments in terms acceptable to other parties 
(reciprocity) and linked with precedent or other institutional laws (generalizability). In other 
words, reason-giving by courts resembles collective deliberation because it presents the public 
with a considered decision incorporating opposing positions.88 While a court considers opposing 
positions in deliberations, their expression in a court’s official judgment may not be explicit. 
When a separate or dissenting opinion can be issued, there is greater guarantee that opposing or 
                                                           
86 Martin Shapiro, ‘The Reason Giving Requirement’, University of Chicago Legal Forum, (1992), pp. 179-220. 
87 Forst, The Right to Justification.  
88 Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’, Yale 
Law Journal, 107:2 (1997), p. 321. 
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alternative viewpoints will be expressed. While there is some argument to whether separate and 
dissenting opinions can destabilize international adjudication, scholars have argued that separate 
or dissenting opinions improve reason-giving.89   
Third, the reasoning offered – and the scope of judicial decisions – may also catalyze 
public discussion. Sunstein argues that, “case-specific judgments operate as a kind of ‘remand’ 
to the public for further proceedings, at least in the sense that they do not foreclose those 
proceedings and may even spur them through the visibility of court decisions.”90 ICs are often 
limited to case-specific judgments, especially when their judgments are not binding on parties 
other than the litigants. That said, the reasoned judgments provided by courts might frame future 
public debates, if not public decisions.  
Again, there are limitations to this value. A pitfall of court-based public justification is 
that reason-giving is often embedded in an inaccessible legal discourse, and thus may not always 
be directly intelligible for the broader public. Affected individuals are often unable to access or 
decipher complex legal decisions. This makes is harder for affected parties to understand the 
ramifications of IC decisions. As such, the broader effects of reason giving are conditioned by 
the public dissemination and translation of court judgments. Publically-issued decisions and 
publication are thus crucial to the ability of ICs to incorporate the value of public justification.  
Second, the actual deliberative quality of public decisions is typically not scrutinized 
closely. Consequently, judicial reasoning may be shaped by strategic negotiation among judges 
and their own policy preferences. The requirement of reason-giving and publicity can 
compensate for these pitfalls, and fosters decisions that are generalizable and reciprocal. In other 
words, the separate elements of public justification – publicity and reasoning – offer the most 
democratizing leverage when taken together because publicity helps to moderate overt strategic 
and particularistic decision-making. Moreover, the incorporation of dissenting opinions is also 
critical for ensuring that arguments are subjected to the give-and-take of deliberative democratic 
reasoning. Given that only 50% of ICs ensure that separate opinions can be issued, though, 
suggests that there is much more scope and leverage for ICs to enhance global democratization. 
                                                           
89 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice’ in Gráinne de Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), The European 
Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 225; Vlad Perju, ‘Reason and Authority in the 
European Court of Justice’, Virginia Journal of International Law 49:2 (2009), pp. 307-377. 
90 Cass Sunstein, ‘Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court’, California Law Review, 84:4 
(1996), p. 1183. 
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Public justification, as we have shown here, can be a feature of institutional design. 
Moreover, it is one that is commonly embedded in the designs of ICs, enabling them to advance 
global democratization. The greater the provisions for publicity of decisions and reasoning, 
especially how dissenting views can and should be incorporated into judicial decision-making, 
the stronger the practice of public justification becomes and thus the greater the contribution ICs 
have for global democratization. As a result, the connections between public justification and the 
other democratic values – equal participation and accountability – run deep. This speaks to the 
need to think about ICs as part of a broader process of global democratization. Institutional rules 
can and should be designed in symbiotic ways. Public justification provides equal respect for 
individuals who participate as well as audiences who view the decision-making. Providing 
individual direct or indirect litigants with public reasons for decisions provides depth to the 
quality of equal participation. Public decisions on matters of administrative and constitutional 
review offer international actors a fair and transparent platform to understand the rationale of 
decision-making. Again this highlights the importance of ICs in a division of labour for global 
democratization. While given powers of constitutional and administrative review over other IOs 
and states, it is important to check this power of ICs (and not through the informal power of 
states and IOs that they are supposed to regulate). Providing avenues of access and reasoned 
justification goes a long way to safeguarding the emergence of global democratization.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we make three points. First, this article has explored if, how, and under what 
conditions ICs contribute to the emergence of democratic values beyond the state. Drawing from 
three prominent strands of democratic theory and a synthesis of recent literature, we found 
evidence that ICs help promote global democratization by: enhancing equality of participation 
for affected actors; holding other international actors to account thus dampening arbitrary power; 
and offering public reasoning. Our analysis did not presume that these three values were the 
correct values to regulate ICs or link ICs with global democratization.91 But drawing from our 
dataset and supplemented with case-specific evidence, we have found strong evidence that ICs 
                                                           
91 Instead we offered separate rationale for adopting these values, derived from democratic theory and recent work 
on global democracy. 
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do embody these values beyond the state. That said, the relationship between all three values and 
ICs were contingent upon the canvassed features of institutional design and issues of 
implementation. We identified procedural and substantive limitations to the attainment of each 
value, thus suggesting that further conditions need to be met for global democratization to 
progress fruitfully. Ultimately, though, we suggest that global democratization is far from a 
chimera, but rather a tangible set of values that can be actively strived toward.  
Second, the article speaks directly to the literature in international law on the democratic 
legitimacy of ICs themselves. Although space constrains a full exploration, authors such as 
Armin von Bogdandy, Ingo Venzke, Nienke Grossman, and many others have probed how the 
authority exercised by ICs can be democratically legitimated in the absence of an encompassing 
national framework.92 These authors often highlight the same features we have, especially access 
and public justification, as key to the internal democratic legitimacy of ICs. Our arguments here 
all speak to the fact that the authority of ICs can be democratically legitimated through equal 
participation of stakeholders, curbing arbitrary power, and providing public reasoning for 
decisions. But more importantly our paper also speaks to the role of ICs in the broader landscape 
of global democratization, the potential role they could play in a division of labour, and the 
factors inhibiting realization in practice.  
Finally, the article has several limitations which provide future avenues for research. 
Democratically speaking, equal participation should be offered to those affected by decisions. 
Although we have touched upon the issue, future work should delve into more detail about who 
precisely is given rights of access to ensure that those most in need of participation and 
representation have their interests considered. This will speak to recent literature concerned with 
how multiple demoi emerge across and beyond the confines of the nation state.93 Likewise, 
accountability mechanisms should themselves be justified to those affected by decisions. 
Moreover the deliberative quality of public reasoning by ICs should be subject to greater 
scrutiny. Content analysis and other quantitative measures (such as the Discourse Quality Index) 
                                                           
92 Bogdandy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts ‘; Bogdandy and Venzke, ‘On the Democratic 
Legitimation’; Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’. 
93 Valentini, ’No Global Demos’.  
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offer ways forward on this front.94 It is through this type of in-depth analysis that the normative 
foundations of global democratization can be assessed with more rigour.  
 
                                                           
94 Marco R Steenbergen, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli and Jürg Steiner, ‘Measuring Political Deliberation: A 
Discourse Quality Index’, Comparative European Politics, 1 (2003), pp. 21-48. 
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Appendix: 
Court 
Year in 
operation  
Direct 
litigant 
Indirect 
litigant 
Third 
Party Observer 
Administrative 
review 
Constitutional 
Review 
Delivered 
in public Published 
Reasoned 
opinion 
Separate 
Opinion/ 
Dissent 
      Int’l action 
National 
action 
Int’l 
act 
National 
act     
African Court of 
Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
(ACtHPR) 
2006 No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Andean Tribunal 
of Justice (ATJ) 1984 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Benelux Court of 
Justice  (BCJ) 1974 No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Central American 
Court of Justice 
(CACJ) 
1992 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Caribbean Court 
of Justice (CCJ)† 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Central African 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Community 
Court of Justice  
(CEMAC CJ) 
2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Court of Justice 
of the European 
Union (CJEU) 
1952 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Common Market 
for Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
Court of Justice  
(COMESA CJ) 
1998 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
East African 
Court of Justice 
(EACJ) 
2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Economic Court 
of the 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States (ECCIS)   
1993 No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Economic 
Community of 
West African 
States Court of 
Justice 
(ECOWAS CJ) 
2002 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
European Court 
of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) 
1959 Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
European Free 
Trade Agreement 
Court of Justice 
(EFTA CJ) 
1994 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Inter-American 
Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) 
1979 No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Criminal Court 
(ICC) 
2002 No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Court of Justice 
(ICJ)* 
1947 No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Criminal 
Tribunal of 
Rwanda (ICTR) 
1994 No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
International 
Criminal 
Tribunal of the 
former 
Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) 
1993 No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
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International 
Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea  
(ITLOS)** 
1996 Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mercosur 
Permanent 
Review Tribunal  
(Mercosur PRT) 
2002 No Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes No 
Organization for 
the 
Harmonization of 
Business Law in 
Africa Common 
Court of Justice 
and Arbitration 
(OHADA CCJA) 
1996 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Tribunal of the 
Southern African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC Tribunal) 
2005-2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Western African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
Court of Justice 
(WAEMU CJ) 
1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
World Trade 
Organization 
Appellate Body 
(WTO AB)*** 
1994 No No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes 
Notes:  
* Coding is based on contentious disputes.  
** Direct access is limited to Sea Bed Chamber only. 
*** WTO AB in practice does publish decisions. Also, public observer access is available if all parties to a dispute agree that oral proceedings be made open to 
the public.  
† CCJ is coded based on original jurisdiction. 
Sources: For administrative review see Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, ch. 6. For Constitutional review see Alter, The New Terrain of 
International Law, ch. 8. All other features coded by authors. See supplementary appendix for details.  
